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INCARNATION, TIMELESSNESS, AND EXALTATION
Jonathan Hill

Christian tradition holds not simply that, in Christ, God became human, but
that at the end of his earthly career Christ became exalted (possessing and
exercising the divine attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience), and
yet remained perpetually human. In this paper I consider several models of
the incarnation in the light of these requirements. In particular, I contrast
models that adopt a temporalist understanding of divine eternity with those
that adopt an atemporalist one. I conclude that temporalist models struggle
to accommodate the doctrines of Christ’s exaltation and perpetual humanity, and that the only viable atemporalist models are compositionalist ones.

I
The doctrine of incarnation is the doctrine that a divine person has become human. More specifically, the Christian doctrine of incarnation is
the doctrine that Jesus Christ was both fully human and fully divine, and
yet was a single person. Most of the philosophical literature concerning
this doctrine has focused on the apparent inconsistency of holding that a
single person could be both human and divine, given that humanity and
divinity apparently contain properties that are not co-instantiable.
However, Christianity also traditionally teaches other doctrines about
Christ. In particular, Christians have historically believed the following:
1. After his death, Jesus both was raised from the dead and subsequently ascended into heaven. After these events, he is exalted—i.e.,
he enjoys the full divine life and properties, including omniscience
and omnipotence.1
1
To say that Christ “enjoys the full divine life and properties” means that he not simply
is omniscient and omnipotent, but that there is no self-imposed constraint upon his use
of these and the other divine properties. It is usual among theologians and philosophers
of religion today to suppose that, during his earthly career, Christ did not exercise his
omnipotent power and was not consciously omniscient, at least in his human consciousness; kenotic theorists go further and suppose that he actually ceased to be omnipotent and
omniscient at all. (On the definition of “kenotic” in this context, see note 5 below.) What
(1) states is that, after his exaltation, Christ has and employs the “omni-” properties in the
same way as the wholly non-incarnate Father and Holy Spirit. It makes little difference to
my argument in this paper at which point Christ is supposed to start enjoying the full divine
life and properties—at his resurrection, or his ascension, or some other point. Also, I do not
distinguish here between the divine operative attributes (e.g., omnipotence and omniscience)
and the quiescent ones (e.g., eternity and infinity). Some writers, such as Oliver Crisp, suppose that the exalted Christ has the former but not the latter. See Oliver Crisp, Divinity and
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2. After his exaltation, Jesus remains fully human.
Let us call the first of these the exaltation requirement, and the second the
perpetual humanity requirement.
How central are these requirements to orthodox Christianity? In the
remainder of this section, I give an overview of the reasons why many
writers have considered these requirements to be important, and provide
one or two of my own. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
assess these arguments in detail. My purpose here is to indicate that these
requirements have strong support and are worth taking seriously, rather
than to evaluate that support. In the rest of the paper, I will take it for
granted that these two requirements are important constraints upon models of the incarnation. The question will therefore be: assuming that the
exaltation and perpetual humanity requirements are serious constraints
upon christology, what consequences follow for the metaphysics of incarnation? To the extent that one does take them as serious constraints,
to that extent one will be committed to accepting those consequences.
Conversely, those who are unwilling to accept the consequences may
consider the arguments in this paper to be good reasons not to take the
two requirements seriously.
Let us take the exaltation requirement first. No orthodox Christian, I
think, would doubt that Christ was in some way exalted after his death, a
notion found throughout the New Testament. The Symbol of Nicaea states
that he “went up into the heavens, is coming to judge the living and the
dead.”2 The creed attributed to the first council of Constantinople adds
that he will come “with glory.”3 Does this necessarily mean omniscience
and omnipotence? Certainly the bulk of Christian tradition would hold
that the exalted Christ is omnipotent and omniscient, since the bulk
of Christian tradition holds that he never ceased to be omnipotent and
omniscient even in his earthly career.4 The question whether the exalted
Christ is omnipotent and omniscient, then, arises only for theologians
who hold that, in his earthly career, Christ lacked these properties—i.e.,
theologians who hold kenotic theories of the incarnation. A related question is whether the exalted Christ is functionally omniscient and omnipotent. Again, the bulk of Christian tradition holds not merely that Christ
was omnipotent and omniscient during his earthly career but that he
enjoyed the full exercise of these properties, meaning that he had conscious access to his omniscient knowledge and had the conscious ability
Humanity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15. Here, I largely focus on
the operative attributes and leave it an open question whether the exaltation requirement
also assigns the quiescent attributes to the exalted Christ.
2
Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (London: Sheed & Ward; Washington
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1:5.
3
Tanner, Decrees, 1:24.
4
See, for example, Athanasius, On the Incarnation 17, in Christology of the Later Fathers, ed.
Edward Hardy (London: SCM, 1944), 70–71; Cyril of Alexandria, Third Letter to Nestorius, in
Norman Russell, Cyril of Alexandria (New York: Routledge, 2000), 268, 271.
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to perform any logically possible action any time he wanted to. From that
point of view, there would be no question whether the same was true
of the exalted Christ. But many theologians today—perhaps the majority
among philosophically inclined ones—hold that in his earthly ministry
Christ was omnipotent and omniscient, but deny that he enjoyed the full
exercise of these properties.5 This would leave open the question whether
his exaltation involved his exercising them once again. So to whatever
degree (if at all) one supposes that, in his earthly career, Christ gave up
the divine properties, to that degree, one may ask whether he regained
them upon his exaltation.
While the New Testament is ambiguous regarding Christ’s knowledge
and power during his ministry, it never envisages any restrictions on his
possession of these properties after his exaltation. Colossians 4:2–3 attributes “all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” to the exalted Christ,
while Ephesians 4:10 attributes omnipresence to him. In Matthew 28:18,
the risen Christ states that he has been given all power or authority (pasa
exousia). But C. Stephen Evans has argued that the biblical texts on which
the doctrine of exaltation rests do not settle the question.6 In particular, he
argues that 1 John 3:2 suggests that the exalted Christ is not omnipotent
or omniscient, since it also states that believers will be like him, and “this
does not mean that all followers of Jesus will be made to be omniscient
and omnipotent.”7
The Orthodox tradition, at least, might disagree with that, since the doctrine of theosis states that human beings will share in the divine properties
though not the divine essence. Peter Forrest gives two further reasons for
thinking that any kenosis involved in the incarnation must be temporary:
the divine joy and love of the Trinitarian life requires divine powers, and to
take on permanent kenosis would have been reckless.8 A critic might observe
that there is nothing reckless about abandoning the divine powers if there
are two other divine persons exercising those powers. But that overlooks
5
The idea that, during his earthly ministry, Christ was omnipotent and omniscient but
simply did not exercise these abilities (perhaps because he did not realise he had them,
or perhaps because he just chose not to use them) is sometimes considered a form of
kenotic christology. For example, Oliver Crisp calls such views “functional kenoticism,”
as contrasted with “ontological kenoticism,” the stronger view that Christ actually lacked
the properties in question during his earthly ministry. See Crisp, Divinity and Humanity,
122–147. However, in this paper I follow Peter Forrest’s view that the various forms of
“functional kenoticism” are really only quasi-kenotic, and that a genuinely kenotic theory
involves the claim that the incarnate Christ really lacked these properties, not merely behaved as if he did. See Peter Forrest, “The Incarnation: A Philosophical Case for Kenosis,”
Religious Studies 36 (2000), 128-130. However, the disagreement is primarily one of classification, and those who take Crisp’s side can easily understand my comments about kenoticism
to refer to ontological kenoticism only.
6
C. Stephen Evans, “The Self-Emptying of Love: A Defense of Kenotic Christology,” in
The Incarnation, ed. S. Davis, D. Kendall and G. O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 265–266.
7
Evans, “Self-Emptying,” 266.
8
Forrest, “The Incarnation,” 129.
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the fact that Christian theology has traditionally regarded the second
person of the Trinity as having a special cosmological function: as the
Logos, it is he who is especially associated with maintaining the order of
the universe. Colossians 1:17 and Hebrews 1:3 both attribute this function
to Christ, the apparent meaning in each case being that this is the situation today, not merely something that was true before the incarnation.9
We might reason, moreover, that if the incarnation were to leave the Son
permanently unable or unwilling to do this, then one or both of the other
persons of the Trinity must step in to fill that role; in which case the incarnation does not merely change the Son, but changes the other two persons
of the Trinity as well. That seems problematic.
Whether or not it is a formal requirement of orthodoxy to hold that the
exalted Christ has and exercises the divine “omni-” properties, then, to
deny it does not sit well with traditional Christianity.10
What of the perpetual humanity requirement? While it is hard to find formal pronouncements of this doctrine in church councils, it certainly can be
found in the works of major Christian writers throughout history. We may
cite, for example, such theological heavyweights as Gregory of Nazianzus,11

9
William Temple used a consideration of this kind as an argument against kenotic theories. See William Temple, Christus Veritas (London: Macmillan, 1924), 142–143.
10
Some kenoticists are quite willing to concede that the exalted Christ has and exercises
the “omni-” properties. We may distinguish between what I shall call strong kenoticism,
which holds that the Son had to abandon these properties in order to become human, since
to retain them is formally incompatible with being human, and weak kenoticism, which
holds that there is no such formal incompatibility, but that the Son nevertheless did abandon these properties for other reasons. Weak kenoticism seems to be the favoured option
of most kenoticists today. See, for example, Ronald Feenstra, “Reconsidering Kenotic Christology,” in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, ed. R.
Feenstra and C. Plantinga (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 148–149;
Forrest, “The Incarnation,” 133–134; C. Stephen Evans, “Kenotic Christology and the Nature of God,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. S. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 200–202; and Stephen Davis, “Is Kenosis Orthodox?,”
in Evans, Exploring Kenotic Christology, 114, 121, 136–137. Gottfried Thomasius, generally
regarded as the founder of kenoticism, also seems to have held a similar view—see Thomas
Thompson, “Nineteenth-Century Kenotic Christology,” in Evans, Exploring Kenotic Christology, 84. David Brown, by contrast, has defended a version of strong kenoticism according
to which the Son is divine before the incarnation, human during it, and divine again after
it (but not human)—see David Brown, The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), 257,
and also Feenstra, “Reconsidering Kenotic Christology,” 145. Such a move clearly involves
rejecting the perpetual humanity requirement. If we accept both the exaltation requirement and the perpetual humanity requirement as serious constraints upon models of the
incarnation, we might conclude that weak kenoticism is the only viable version of kenoticism, and indeed the recent authors I have just listed as weak kenoticists all articulate the
position specifically to allow that Christ could be both exalted and human at the same
time after his ascension. However, kenoticism presumably presupposes temporalism: if
the Son really loses certain properties in becoming incarnate, then he really changes, and
consequently cannot be atemporal. Since my argument in this paper is that no temporalist
model of the incarnation can very plausibly accommodate the exaltation and perpetual
humanity requirements, this would be a serious flaw with any form of kenoticism, weak or
strong. Quasi-kenotic theories, however, would be unscathed, since I see no reason why a
quasi-kenoticist should not be an atemporalist.
11
Letter 101, in Hardy, Christology of the Later Fathers, 218.
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Gregory of Nyssa,12 Augustine,13 John of Damascus,14 Thomas Aquinas,15
Martin Luther,16 and Karl Barth.17
Despite this, the doctrine of Christ’s perpetual humanity has been
questioned in the literature on the philosophy of incarnation. Richard
Swinburne comments that the doctrine is found only in “[s]ome lesser
creeds and church pronouncements,” notably the Lateran council of
649 CE.18 While he very briefly considers and argues for its possibility,
he concludes: “I cannot see the permanent union as a central Christian
doctrine.”19 But Swinburne himself lists a number of reasons, drawn
from Augustine and Aquinas, why it might be a good thing for God to be
incarnate—to reflect the goodness of his creation, for example, or to show
us the dignity of human nature.20 If these considerations support the
doctrine of incarnation over no incarnation at all, they equally support
a permanent incarnation over a temporary one. For example, if God’s
becoming incarnate reflects the goodness of his creation, then God’s
becoming permanently incarnate does so even more. Again, if the Son
remains human perpetually, that would demonstrate a much greater
commitment to humanity than a mere temporary union would.
Peter Forrest makes the important point that denying Christ’s perpetual
humanity is incompatible “with traditional devotion to Jesus as mediator
between the purely divine and the purely human.”21 Ronald Feenstra also
puts forward a number of considerations in favour of the doctrine of Christ’s
perpetual humanity: the use of the present tense in the Chalcedonian definition and other normative statements of faith when referring to Christ’s
humanity; the fact that it would show that glorification and humanity are
compatible, allowing us the hope of future glorification ourselves; and the
fact that many Christians are committed to the view that Christ retains
his body after his ascension, which means he must be human.22 This last
Catechetical Oration 16, in Hardy, Christology of the Later Fathers, 293–294.
De Trinitate I 9, in Stephen McKenna, Saint Augustine: The Trinity (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 27–28.
14
”The Orthodox Faith III,” chapter 6 in Frederick Chase, John of Damascus: Writings
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1970), 280–281.
15
Summa theologiae 3 q. 57 a. 2; q. 57 a. 5; q. 58 a. 3, in C. Thomas Moore, Summa Theologiae,
vol. 55: The Resurrection of the Lord (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1976), 83, 93–95, 107–109.
16
The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ against the Fanatics; Confession Concerning
Christ’s Supper, in Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut Lehmann (St. Louis, MO:
Concordia; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1955–1986), 36: 342 and 37: 214. See Bernhard Lohse,
Martin Luther’s Theology (Edinburgh: Clark, 1999), 230–231.
17
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: Clark, 1936–1969), IV.2: 97–103.
18
Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 236.
19
Ibid., 247.
20
Ibid., 218–219.
21
Forrest, “The Incarnation,” 134.
22
Feenstra, “Reconsidering Kenotic Christology,” 147. On the doctrine of Christ’s continued embodiment, see the citations from Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa
above, notes 11 and 12, and also see the discussion below, p. 17.
12
13
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consideration is perhaps weaker than the others, since it is presumably
possible for Christ to retain a human body without being genuinely human—Apollinarianism was condemned, after all, on the grounds that it
maintained the former without the latter.
From an Orthodox perspective, Feenstra’s second consideration is especially compelling. In the well-worn words of Athanasius, God became
man so that man might become God.23 If God only became man for a
while, and is no longer man, then this surely casts into doubt man’s hope
of becoming God; at the very least it raises the unsettling prospect that
theosis itself might be temporary and that after enjoying it for a while the
faithful might find themselves disunited from God.24 Moreover, Orthodox
tradition explicitly connects this hope with Christ’s ascension and exaltation. Maximus the Confessor wrote:
the glorified incarnate Logos of God is Himself a harbinger of His spiritual
advent, leading our souls forward by His own teachings to receive His divine and manifest advent.25

This view is not limited to Orthodox theologians. The entry on the ascension in the New Catholic Encyclopedia also links Christ’s perpetual humanity
to eschatology, though in a different way:
Mankind thus enters into the sphere of the Trinity once and for all in the
Person of the Word incarnate as the Epistle to the Hebrews insists (Heb.
9.26; 10.10). Nothing henceforth will be able to separate from God the human nature that has entered into heaven. The Ascension of Christ, then,
is the ascension of man, united to the divinity, arriving substantially at its
goal, substantially served forever.26

These points suggest not only that both the exaltation requirement and
the perpetual humanity requirement are indeed important to orthodox
Christianity, but that they are theologically closely linked to each other.

23
On the Incarnation 54, in Hardy, Christology of the Later Fathers, 107; see also sections 8–9,
pp. 62–64.
24
Origen apparently believed that this had already happened—that before the creation
of the world, human souls had all been united to God, but that for some reason they fell
away from him; see Joseph Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-Century
Church (London: SCM, 1985), 103–107. Origen also believed that, at the final restoration,
human souls would be restored to union with God (it is uncertain whether, as usually supposed, he thought that this would be true of all human souls—see Henri Crouzel, Origen
[Edinburgh: Clark, 1989], 262–266); it is unclear how, if at all, he secured against the danger
of their falling away once again.
25
In the Philokalia, “Second Century on Theology,” in The Philokalia, ed. G. Palmer,
P. Sherrard, and K. Ware (London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), II: 144 (my italics). A
related idea found in other writers is that justice demands that when Christ judges humanity at the end of time, he does it as both God and man; and that when the blessed perceive
him in heaven, they perceive him as both God and man. See Augustine, De Trinitate I 12.
For more Maximus texts on this topic, see Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware, The Philokalia, II:
148–149, 287–288.
26
J. Murray, “Ascension of Jesus Christ (Theological),” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, ed.
B. Marthaler et al. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), I: 772.
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The fact that Christ is exalted, combined with the fact that he remains human, is of great soteriological significance.27
I conclude that even if the claim that the exalted Christ exercises full
divine powers, and the claim that the exalted Christ remains fully human, are not considered to be formal requirements of orthodoxy, they are
nevertheless claims that few orthodox Christians will wish to deny. As I
indicated at the beginning of this section, in what follows I will assume
that both the exaltation requirement and the perpetual humanity requirement are serious constraints upon models of the incarnation. Any such
model must allow that both of the following claims are true:
1. It is true now that Christ has, and exercises, all the divine attributes,
including omnipotence and omniscience.
2. It is true now that the Son is fully human as well as fully divine.
There is one more point to make by way of preliminaries, concerning
religious language. A theologian might well suggest that claims about
Christ’s knowledge and power, or his ongoing humanity, are not meant to
be taken literally. In particular, the “now” in both (1) and (2) above is not
intended literally: it is not really the case right now that Christ is omniscient, omnipotent, and human. These are, perhaps, figurative statements
about his ongoing work in the church, or the actions of the Holy Spirit.
And in that case, it is not necessary for a Christian philosopher to try to
explain how they can be literally true.
This may well be a theologically viable position, but to assess it would
fall well outside the scope of this paper.28 Nevertheless, even if we accept
this position, we may still consider to what extent a Christian philosopher
is forced into it. Must a Christian philosopher hold that statements about
Christ’s post-glorification status are figurative, since it is impossible to
take them literally? Or is a literal meaning at least possible, even if a figurative one is preferred? In what follows, our purpose is to assess whether
it is possible to hold (1) and (2) to be literally true, and if so, whether such
an approach would commit a Christian philosopher to other positions.
For example, is a literal interpretation of (1) and (2) inconsistent with some
models of the incarnation? If so, a Christian philosopher who holds one of
those models is committed to understanding (1) and (2) only figuratively
(or denying them altogether), whereas someone who holds a different
model may retain the options of understanding (1) and (2) either literally
or figuratively.
27
Gerald O’Collins makes a similar defence of the importance of Christ’s perpetual humanity. See Gerald O’Collins, Incarnation (London: Continuum, 2002), 40–41. Hans Urs Von
Balthasar also insists that the permanent exaltation of humanity in Christ is essential for
salvation. See Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord (Edinburgh: Clark, 1982–1989),
VII: 403–404.
28
However, the considerations given above in favour of taking (1) and (2) as serious constraints upon models of the incarnation seem to me to be considerations against taking (1)
and (2) as merely figurative claims.
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II
It is a traditional theistic belief that God is eternal, but theists have
interpreted this belief in two ways. The first way, which we may call
temporalism, holds that God exists within time, and exists at every point
of time. As it is sometimes expressed, he is everlasting: there never was a
time when he did not exist, and there never will be a time when he does
not. The second way of interpreting the belief that God is eternal may
be called atemporalism, and it holds that God does not exist within time
at all. Time, on this view, is a feature of the created universe; God, being
uncreated, exists “outside” it, just as he exists “outside” space (taking
“outside” here to mean that he is non-temporal and non-spatial, not that
he is literally outside time and space in a spatial way).
The distinction between these two interpretations of divine eternity
is well established, and there are well known arguments for and against
them both.29 I shall not rehearse these here, but assume for our present
purposes that the two interpretations are both coherent and plausible. We
can accordingly divide models of the incarnation into two broad categories, depending on which version of God’s eternity they are combined
with. A temporalist model of the incarnation is one that combines belief in
the incarnation with the view of God as everlasting. On such a model, the
Son, being God, exists at every point in time. It follows that the Son existed
prior to the incarnation, taking “prior” here in its usual temporal sense:
for any time t earlier than the time of the incarnation, the Son existed
at time t, and was not incarnate at that time. The model holds, furthermore, that at a particular moment in time, the Son became incarnate and
therefore changed from being non-incarnate to being incarnate.
Can a temporalist model satisfy the two requirements we have identified above? We can see what issues are involved in doing so if we distinguish between three broad categories of temporalist models.
The first category of temporalist model is what we may call “transformationalist” models. On such models, the Son becomes human by being
transformed into a human being.30 Transformationalist models may be
subdivided further, depending on what we think a human being actually
is. A physicalist, who thinks that a human being is identical with her body,
will hold that the Son is transformed simply into a (living) human body.
Trenton Merricks has defended just such a model.31 A dualist who thinks
29
See, for example, William Hasker, “Eternity and Providence,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology, ed. C. Taliaferro and C. Meister (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 81–85; or, for a fuller summary of the issues involved, Brian
Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
141–167.
30
See my “Introduction,” in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. A. Marmodoro and J.
Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8–10.
31
See Trenton Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. P. Van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2007), 294–299.
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that a human being is identical with a combination of body and mind will
hold that the Son is transformed into such a combination.32 (A third possibility is that a human being is identical with the mind alone, but I consider
this below under the distinct category of Son-body models.) Either way, the
Son is changed into something which is either fully or partially physical.
Such a model, however, faces severe difficulties in meeting the exaltation and perpetual humanity requirements. The former, as we have seen,
stipulates that Christ should enjoy omnipotence and omniscience after
his exaltation. But if Christ is identical with a human body, then a human body must be omnipotent and omniscient. Is that possible? A human
body does things by moving itself and affecting the environment directly
around itself, and it knows things by storing information in its brain. A
human body could not directly exercise omnipotent power. And a human
brain could not have the capacity to store the infinite amount of knowledge required for omniscience.33
These problems need not be insuperable. C. Stephen Evans points out
that the New Testament portrays Christ’s resurrected body as “spiritual” and glorified, possessing powers beyond our own. Even though it
may be impossible to exercise the divine properties in a normal human
body, perhaps it is possible with a glorified body.34 This may be plausible,
32
The position sketched here differs from the kind of model in which the Son is thought,
in the incarnation, to acquire a part which is identical to a human body (or, perhaps, which
is identical to a human body plus a human mind). This latter model conceives the relation
of the Son to his human elements in a way rather analogous to my relation to a wooden
leg which I acquire, at least on a reading of this situation in which the wooden leg counts
as part of me. However, for the purposes of this paper, I class such a model as a Son-body
model (if what is acquired is just a body) or as compositionalist (if what is acquired is a
body and a soul), because on this understanding, the incarnate Christ consists of the preincarnate Son plus something else—just as I, after having the wooden leg fitted, now consist
of pre-wooden-leg-me plus the leg. Whether we say that the incarnate Christ is identical
with the pre-incarnate Son (and conceive of the incarnation as him acquiring a part) or not
(and conceive of the incarnation as him becoming a part of a greater whole) makes little
difference to our purposes here. The transformationalist model I refer to in this section, by
contrast, would hold that the pre-incarnate Son is transformed into a body plus something
else (i.e., a soul), not simply that he acquires a body (or a body and a soul) as parts. Such
a model seems, on the face of it, quite implausible. Even supposing we can make sense of
the idea of an incorporeal entity being transformed into a corporeal one (as a physicalist
transformationalist would hold), it is harder still to make sense of the idea of any entity
being transformed into two or more distinct entities, especially if one of these is corporeal
and the other incorporeal. It is not clear to me whether anyone has actually defended such
a model. For this reason, in what follows I take transformationalist models in general to
be physicalist, holding that the incarnate Son is identical with a body, and ignore the possibility of dualist transformationalist models; but the objections which apply to physicalist
transformationalist models also apply to dualist ones (in addition to others).
33
An anonymous reader for Faith and Philosophy suggests that quantum particles may
have the capacity for storing infinite information. However, even if an infinite amount of
information could be stored in a finite physical volume in this way, it would be impossible
to access, let alone to manipulate it, in the way that would be necessary for that information
to count as a person’s knowledge. And any physical system which did somehow have the
ability not only to store an infinite amount of information but to process it would hardly be
a genuinely human brain.
34
Evans, “Kenotic Christology,” 201–202.
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although it does not address how Christ’s body might be omnipotent and
omniscient before his exaltation, should one wish to affirm this. A second
solution which could address this might be available to non-physicalist
transformationalists. If the incarnate Son is identical not simply with a
body but with a body plus a soul, one could say that there are no theoretical restrictions on saying that a soul could be omnipotent and omniscient
and indeed unlimited in whatever way is required for divinity. Since
souls, if they exist, are pretty mysterious things, we cannot know that
they are unable to exercise such powers.
A second problem facing a transformationalist model is the perpetual
humanity requirement. If it is necessary for the Son to be identical with
a living human body, or with a living human body plus something else,
in order to be a human person, then the Son must continue to be identical
with a living human body for the rest of time.35 On a temporalist model,
that means that Jesus’s body must continue to exist for the rest of time.
Where would it be? There are three possibilities, all of which have their
own advantages and disadvantages.
The most straightforward possibility is that Jesus’s body might be
somewhere in the universe as we know it—spatially connected to us, in
a remote region of the Earth, or on another planet, or in the interstellar
void. This seems at least a difficult thing to accept, especially if it would
mean that we could, at least in theory, travel to it. At the same time, it is
not impossible; since the body is a glorified one, that would at least mean
it could remain imperceptible or unrecognisable, if God wishes, as the
risen Christ is sometimes represented in the Gospels.36
A second possibility is suggested by Richard Swinburne (though not in
the context of a model of the incarnation of this kind):
If we are to rise again with our bodies, as creeds have normally claimed
explicitly, there must in another space be a place for us, which if he so chose
Christ could inhabit with his human body. If he did so, God thereby would
have been continuing to give content to three of the reasons for the Incarnation that I discussed earlier in the chapter—to express and show to us the
goodness of human nature and to show his love for us.37

The suggestion, then, is that there could be another space to which Jesus’s
body might be translated upon his exaltation. Although Swinburne does
not explicitly say so, we are presumably to think of this space as quite
35
Alvin Plantinga hints at such an objection; see Alvin Plantinga, “On Heresy, Mind and
Truth,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 186. Merricks quotes the passage in Merricks, “The
Word Made Flesh,” 295, but does not address this part of it.
36
Gregory of Nazianzus dismisses such notions in his Letter 101, p. 218. A variant on
this notion is the supposition that Christ’s body exists throughout our universe—being omnipresent in it. Oliver Crisp rejects this claim as absurd; see Crisp, Divinity and Humanity,
16–18.
37
Swinburne, The Christian God, 237. Despite what Swinburne says here, I do not see why
the Christian belief in the general resurrection requires the existence of “another space” for
this to happen in; it could happen in this space, but in the future.
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distinct from the space of our own universe. It would be a kind of parallel
space—a parallel universe, perhaps—one to which we could not travel by
ordinary means, even in theory.
A problem with this possibility is that this parallel space would have
to share the same time as our space. This is because, for the temporalist
transformationalist, to say that the Son is incarnate now is to say that he
is identical with a body now. That body must therefore exist now, which
means it must exist within our timeline, not in some alternate timeline
to which we are not temporally related. But the notion of a distinct space
that nevertheless shares our time is hard to square with modern physics,
which considers both space and time to be features of a single “spacetime.” Such a view is fundamental to relativity theory, and is so central
to modern physics that even the Newtonian theory of space and time is
commonly expressed in the same terms for ease of comparison between
the different models.38 But if space and time are as intimately connected
as this, there could not be two completely distinct, unconnected spaces
which share the same timeline.39 Any parallel space would have to have
its own timeline, and events in that timeline could not meaningfully be
said to be simultaneous with events in our own. If that is so, then we
could not say that anything in that alternate universe is happening “now.”
In which case, Jesus’s body could not exist there “now.”
A second problem with this view is that it is hard to see how a body
in our space could be identical with a body in another space altogether.
Presumably we are to think of Jesus’s body disappearing in our space,
and reappearing an instant later in the other space. But he could not move
through the intervening space between these two locations, because by
hypothesis there is none. And in that case, what makes the body that appears identical with the one that disappears? How would this scenario
differ from one in which Jesus’s body is annihilated and a duplicate created in a parallel space?
A third possibility for the location of Jesus’s body would be to appeal
to hyperspace. In this context, the “hyperspace” theory is that there exist physical dimensions beyond the three with which we are familiar. In
addition to the three axes of the familiar three spatial dimensions, there
is at least one more—a fourth spatial axis which we simply cannot perceive. If so, then there could be far more to the universe than we can see,
even in theory. Just as the inhabitants of Flatland—a two-dimensional
world—might be amazed to discover another Flatland a centimetre above
38
See, for example, John Norton, “Philosophy of Space and Time,” in Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science, ed. W. Salmon et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 208.
Note that by referring to “spacetime” here I do not mean to endorse substantivalism, the
view that spacetime is a substance; my argument requires no such assumption.
39
An anonymous reader for Faith and Philosophy suggests that spacetime could branch,
allowing Christ’s body to exist in the first century in our own spacetime, and then for its
timeline to branch from ours into a distinct spacetime. But even if we accept this possibility,
it would still not be true that Christ’s body exists now. And if for Christ to be human now is
for him to have a body now, it would not be the case that Christ is human now.
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their heads, and another above that, so too it may be that there is another
three-dimensional universe “above” ours, and another “above” that, and
so on. This differs from the “other space” theory just discussed in that
hyperspace is not a completely distinct universe from our own, spatially
(and temporally) unconnected to it. Rather, it is part of our universe, but
we are simply unable to get to it, just as a two-dimensional entity could
not jump from one page of a closed book to the next. It is part of our own
space, and the next plane along might be literally a few centimetres away
(or much further), though not in any direction with which we are familiar.
This being so, I see no problem with the supposition that events in hyperspace could be simultaneous with events here. Moreover, a body could
presumably move from here to there without the question of annihilation
arising, because it could follow a continuous path to its new location. It’s
simply that this path would be at right-angles (figuratively speaking) to
all of the directions we can perceive. It would appear to us to have been
annihilated, but it would not be.40
For these reasons, the hyperspace theory seems the most attractive to
someone wishing to maintain that Christ’s body exists now.41 A possible
flaw with this theory is that if it is possible for one object (Christ’s body)
to move “ana or kata” (i.e., along the proposed fourth spatial axis), then
it would presumably be possible, in theory if not in practice, for other
objects to do the same—perhaps including us. In that case, the hyperspace
theory may seem really to be a more exotic version of the first theory,
that Christ’s body exists in our universe, miraculously shielded from our
perception or reach. Whether that would make it a less palatable theory
may be a matter of taste. What matters for our purposes is that a temporalist transformationalist who accepts the perpetual humanity requirement
will be committed to one of these three views. While an individual Christian philosopher may be happy to accept the possibility of hyperspace,
for example, it may be less palatable to suppose that Christian doctrine
requires a belief in it.
III
A temporalist model of the incarnation which grounds the identity of
the pre-incarnate Son and the incarnate Son in Jesus’s human body, then,
faces problems that may demand a high price in terms of philosophical
commitment. What of the second class of temporalist models? We may
call such models Son-body models: they hold that, in becoming incarnate,
Peter Forrest envisages something like this; see Forrest, “The Incarnation,” 139 n5.
Hud Hudson argues for the plausibility of the hyperspace theory, from a Christian
viewpoint, on the basis of its usefulness in explaining a number of Christian doctrines,
such as heaven and hell, Eden, the location of angels and demons, and—most relevantly for
our purposes—various New Testament miracles including the appearance and disappearance of the resurrected Christ. He also implies, though does not address in detail, that after
the ascension Christ could be conceived of as existing in hyperspace. See Hud Hudson,
Hyperspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 180–204.
40
41
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the Son is transformed not into a body or a body plus something else, but
into a human mind. He acquires a body, but it is distinct from him. Such a
model would require a form of substance dualism in the case of normal
human beings, according to which the mind or soul is a substance distinct from the body.42 Richard Swinburne offers such a model, according
to which the Son becomes human not by being transformed into a human
body but by becoming united to a human body in the same way that a human mind is normally united to its body. In fact, the Son actually becomes
the human mind of the body.43
Such a model has little difficulty with the exaltation requirement. The
Son is not physical or partly physical, so there is no obvious reason why he
should have any difficulties enjoying omniscience and omnipotence after
his exaltation. But there are worse problems with the perpetual humanity requirement. What, on the Son-body model, is it that makes the Son
human at all during the period of the incarnation? Swinburne seems to
suggest two answers. The first concerns the Son’s relation to a human body.
Swinburne argues that to have a body, or to be embodied, means to exist
in certain relations with a chunk of physical matter: in particular, to derive
one’s knowledge of the world through that chunk, and to act on the world
via that chunk. My body is my body because it is through my body that I
perceive the world and through that same body that I can act upon the
world. During the incarnation, the Son exists in this relation to the human
body of Jesus, and this is why we can legitimately say that it is his body.44
But does this continue to be the case after the exaltation? Here, the Sonbody model hits precisely the same problem as the transformationalist
one. If to be human means to exist in a certain relation to a human body,
then if the Son continues to be human for ever, his human body must
exist for ever. So to be orthodox, the model requires us to suppose that
Jesus’s body continues to exist after the exaltation until the end of time;
that at any given time, including right now, the statement “Jesus’s human
body exists somewhere today” is true. We have seen that this may carry a
philosophical price not everyone will be willing to pay.
There are further problems. In the case of transformationalist models,
the main problem is working out where the human body might be; there
is at least no problem with establishing what makes the human body the
Son’s body. It is his body because it is identical with him.45 In the case of
Son-body models, however, this option is not available, since such models
explicitly deny that Christ’s body is identical with the Son. Rather, they
hold that what makes Christ’s body the Son’s body is the fact that it exists
42
See A. Marmodoro and J. Hill, “Modeling the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” Philosophy and Theology 20 (2009), 115.
43
Swinburne, The Christian God, 192–200.
44
Ibid., 194.
45
Merricks identifies this as a particular strength of the physicalist model. See Merricks,
“The Word Made Flesh,” 297.
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in certain relations to the Son—the same relations in which my body
exists in relation to me. To have a body is, minimally, to be related to a
chunk of matter in such a way as to gain one’s knowledge of the world,
and to act upon the world, principally (or perhaps exclusively) through
it; and what makes my body my body is the fact that it is the chunk of
matter with which I have these relations. There is, perhaps, no problem
in applying these criteria to Christ during his earthly career. His body is
the Son’s body during that period because it exists in these relations to
the Son. But after his exaltation, serious problems arise, because of the exaltation requirement. As we have seen, that requirement states that after
his exaltation, Christ enjoys the divine properties, including omniscience
and omnipotence. For the temporalist, this must mean that, right now, the
Son is omniscient and omniscient. That means that, whatever relations he
bears to his body, they are not the relations that Swinburne identifies as
the relations that would make it his body. He is not using it as his principal
means of gaining knowledge, because he does not gain knowledge at all,
because he is omniscient. And he is not using it as his principal means of
acting upon the world, because he is acting upon the world in the same
way that he did before the incarnation ever happened—i.e., through the
exercise of his omnipotent will.46 So even if Jesus’ body does still exist, it
is hard to see any way in which it could legitimately be called the Son’s
body; it would be, at best, the body that used to be the Son’s, in which case
the Son would not now be incarnate.47
It seems, then, that the proponent of a Son-body model has even greater
difficulty than the transformationalist with the notion that the Son continues to be embodied. But the Son-body theorist has a possible response to
this, which is not available to the transformationalist. Swinburne suggests
that there is a second reason why we can say that the Son becomes human
in the incarnation, quite apart from his embodiment. This is that his mind
becomes split in some sense. Where, before the incarnation, the Son had a
single stream of consciousness, during the incarnation this stream splits
into two. The divine stream of consciousness continues as before, but it is
joined by a human stream. The divine stream remains omniscient, but the
human stream is not omniscient. They exist in an asymmetrical accessing
46
An anonymous reader for Faith and Philosophy notes that every time we move our bodies, we affect the world only by willing to do so. So for the incarnate Christ to act on the
world through his omnipotent will seems no different. But in fact we do not move our bodies purely by willing to do so. As Elizabeth Anscombe points out, I cannot cause a matchbox
to move simply by “willing” it to do so—but I cannot cause my arm to move simply by
“willing” it to do so in the same way, either. On this, see Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), 51–52. If that is correct, then there is indeed a difference between
accomplishing things by pure will, as a divine person would do when acting omnipotently,
and accomplishing things by bodily movement.
47
These considerations also suggest that a Son-body theorist should be committed to at
least the view that, in his lifetime, Christ was not actively omnipotent or omniscient—i.e.,
she should hold some form of “functional kenoticism.” On this, see note 5, above. Either
that or the Son-body theorist needs an alternative account of what makes a certain piece of
matter someone’s body.
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relation: the divine stream is privy to the contents of the human stream,
but not vice versa.48
How can this help meet the perpetual humanity requirement? The
Son-body theorist who accepts the divided mind theory might say that
after Jesus’s exaltation, he continues to be human not because he continues to have a human body but because his mind continues to contain the
human stream of consciousness. It is this that makes him human, not the
having of a human body.
But such a response then falters on the exaltation requirement. If the
Son’s mind remains split into the two streams after his exaltation, he does
not enjoy his divine properties in the requisite way. The human stream,
at least, remains non-omniscient, or at least not functionally omniscient
(that is, aware of his knowledge of all truths). The Son-body theorist might
respond that this is not a problem. The divine stream “takes over.” When
we pray to the Son, for example, it is the divine stream that listens and,
perhaps, acts upon our prayer. But this seems very problematic. What has
happened to the human stream? Does it exist in some kind of solipsistic
world of its own, still unaware of what is going on in the divine stream,
perhaps still unaware that it is even divine itself? Surely not.
More fundamentally, there are serious theological problems with any
account of the humanity of the exalted Christ which countenances his not
having a body. Such a view threatens the centrality of the resurrection
to Christian faith. Part of the significance of Jesus’s resurrection, according to the New Testament, is that it makes possible the resurrection of all
people at the end of time. Paul states that those who are united to Christ
in his death will also share in his resurrection,49 and elsewhere expresses
this idea with the image of “first fruits”: Christ’s resurrection is the first of
many.50 The New Testament envisages that the general resurrection will
be permanent; the book of Revelation, for example, speaks of the saints
ruling forever in the new Jerusalem.51 However, if the Son were to cease
to be incarnate, even if he remained technically human, his resurrection
would not be permanent. If that were so, then there would be no reason to
suppose that anyone else’s resurrection were permanent.52
We may conclude, then, that a temporalist Son-body model of the incarnation faces severe difficulties in meeting the two requirements we
have been considering.
There remains the third kind of temporalist model, which does not
identify the Son with either Jesus’s body or his mind. Such a model would
Swinburne, The Christian God, 199–204. See also O’Collins, Incarnation, 79–87.
Romans 6:5.
50
1 Corinthians 15:20.
51
Revelation 22:5.
52
On this, see the comments by Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa cited above,
notes 11 and 12. See also O’Collins, Incarnation, 41, where he argues that if the exalted Christ
were to exist in a disembodied state this would rob the resurrection of all its point.
48
49
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be a compositionalist model. It would hold that, at the moment of incarnation, the Son became united to a human body and soul (assuming dualism, but a compositionalist need not be a dualist, in which case the Son
was united to a human body endowed with a human mind in the normal
fashion). On this model, the Son does not change when he becomes united
to the human body and soul, except to the extent that he becomes related
to them in a certain way. He is not transformed into anything—neither
into a human body nor into a human soul.53
How would a temporalist compositionalist model address the exaltation and perpetual humanity requirements? It faces similar difficulties to
the Son-body model. If the Son’s being human consists in his existing in a
certain relation to a human body, then we must once again either face the
implausible prospect of that body’s continuing to exist somewhere for as
long as the Son remains human or embrace the theologically unacceptable
notion of the Son’s remaining human without remaining incarnate.54 And
if the Son’s being human consists in his existing in a certain relation to a
human soul (assuming dualism), then again we must ask what state that
human soul exists in after the exaltation. Does he know about his own
divinity or exaltation? And if the Son’s being human consists in his existing in a certain relation to both the human body and the human soul—as
seems most reasonable—then we have both problems at the same time.
IV
It seems, then, that all three versions of temporalist models of the incarnation struggle when faced with the exaltation problem. This is because they share a basic principle, which is the source of their difficulties.
The principle concerns what we may call human-identifying circumstances,
or HICs. Human-identifying circumstances are circumstances under which
we may legitimately say of the Son that he is (a) human, and (b) identical
with this human, namely Jesus. They therefore have two roles: they are
53
See my “Introduction,” 10–11, 12–13. I do not here distinguish between the many different kinds of compositionalist models. For some of these different kinds, see Thomas
Flint, “Should Concretists Part with Mereological Models of the Incarnation?” in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. A Marmodoro and J. Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2011), 68–87.
54
One advantage that a compositionalist model has over the Son-body model, however,
is that it might still be possible for Christ’s body to be the Son’s body after his exaltation. The
Son-body theorist is committed to the claim that the Son’s relation to Christ’s body is the
same in all significant respects to the relation that we all hold to our bodies, because on this
model, the Son takes the place of the human mind in Christ, and what makes the Son actually identical with Christ’s human mind (and not merely supplanting it) is his relation to the
body. It is because he bears the same relation to the body that our minds bear to our bodies
that he is a human mind. So if the Son’s relation to his body differs in any significant respect,
Christ does not have a human mind and Apollinarianism follows. The compositionalist,
however, is not committed to this claim, because on compositionalism, the role of Christ’s
human mind is not filled by the Son. On this model, Christ has a human mind in addition
to his divine mind. So on a compositionalist view, it may be the case that whatever relation
exists between the Son and Christ’s body in virtue of which it is the Son’s body is a quite
different relation, and could still exist even when the Son is omnipotent and omniscient.
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what make the Son human, and they are what make him a particular
human being.55 As we have seen, different models of the incarnation have
different answers to the question what the HICs actually are. Transformationalist models hold that the HICs are that the Son be identical with a
certain human body, or a certain human body and soul; Son-body models
hold that the HICs are that the Son be identical with a certain human soul
alone, or, to put it another way, that he exist in a certain relation with a
certain human body; and compositionalist models hold that the HICs are
that the Son exist in a certain relation with a certain human body and
soul. What the different models have in common is that they hold that
there are HICs of one kind or another, which it is possible for the Son
to satisfy.
But temporalist models of the incarnation are, in addition to this, committed to a principle about the HICs, which we may call the Temporalist
Incarnation principle, or TI:
TI: Whatever the HICs are in virtue of which the Son may legitimately
be identified with a particular human during the time of the incarnation, these HICs must (a) not be temporally indexed, and (b) hold at every
time when the Son may legitimately be identified with that human.
A temporally indexed circumstance (state of affairs, property, etc.) is one that
includes within its definition a reference to a particular time. For example,
the property of weighing over 50 kg on 10 January 2010 is a temporally
indexed property, and anyone who did weigh over 50 kg on 10 January
2010 has that property even at times when she weighs less. By contrast,
the property of weighing over 50 kg is not temporally indexed. A person
has that property only when she does weigh over 50 kg; at times when she
weighs less, she lacks that property.
Take for example a compositionalist model, according to which the
HICs are that the Son exist in some specified relation with the human
body and soul. According to TI, the Son is incarnate only at those times
when he does exist in that relation with the human body and soul. At
times when he does not exist in that relation, he is not incarnate. Since he
does not exist in that relation before 4 BCE (assuming the incarnation to
begin at this date), he is not incarnate before that date. What if we were
to say that the HICs are that he exist in that relation between 4 BCE and
30 CE? In that case, the HICs would hold at all times, since it is true even
before 4 BCE that he exists in the relevant relation after that date. But this
is what the clause in TI about temporal indexing excludes. It says that the
circumstances in virtue of which the Son is said to be human cannot be
55
I use the term “circumstances” here rather than “properties” for two reasons. The first
is that “property” has technical connotations which I wish to avoid. The second is that,
on at least some models of the incarnation, the circumstances in virtue of which the Son
may be called human are not properties at all, at least not properties that the Son bears. By
speaking only of “circumstances,” I want to keep the term as general as possible, so that it
covers all models of the incarnation.
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this kind of circumstance, appealing to a state of affairs that holds at some
particular time. And the same applies to non-compositionalist temporalist models, although they will specify different HICs.
Why think this? What is wrong with HICs such as “existing in a certain
relation to the human body and soul between 4 BCE and 30 CE”? An obvious problem with them is that they would make the Son incarnate before
the period in question as well as afterwards.56 But then it would be meaningless to say that the Son ever became incarnate at all; all that one could
say was that he entered the period in virtue of which he is permanently
incarnate.
Suppose we were to change the HICs to specify a current or past situation, such as “currently existing, or having existed, in a certain relation to
the human body and soul between 4 BCE and 30 CE.” Then the Son would
count as incarnate (only) from 4 BCE onwards, even if he no longer exists
in the relevant relation to the human body and soul after 30 CE.
This would still be a case of temporally indexed HICs, although the
indexing would be ordinal rather than cardinal (i.e., specifying that the
conditions hold in the present or in the past, rather than at particular
times). But can a person or thing have a non-temporally-indexed property
or relation on the basis of a temporally indexed one? To illustrate, suppose
that Peter and Paul are both six feet tall at time t, but Peter later grows.
Peter has, at all times, the property of being-six-feet-tall-at-t; consequently
he has, at all times, the property of being-the-same-height-as-Paul-at-t.
But that relation is just as temporally indexed as the property on which
it is based. Similarly, to retain the example of a compositionalist model
of the incarnation, if being related to a human body and soul makes the
Son human, then being-related-to-a-human-body-and-soul-at-t gives the
Son the property of being-human-at-t. It doesn’t give him the property of
being human simpliciter.
To illustrate, my fiancée is not my wife until I marry her. I cannot
truthfully say “She is my wife” until I exist in the relevant relation to her.
Moreover, if we later divorce, I cannot truthfully say “She is my wife”
after that date either, because I will no longer exist in the relevant relation to her. Here again, we see that even though it is true of me at all times
that I exist in a marriage-making relation to her between such-and-such
a date and such-and-such a date, that does not make it legitimate to say
that I am married to her at all times. I am married to her only between
those dates.
Some properties seem to be different. Ex-presidents of the US have
the properties of being addressed as “Mr. President,” being protected by
security personnel, and so on, in virtue of having been president.57 Let us
56
This assumes that the future is real, and that things can have future-indexed properties. A defender of a temporalist model of the incarnation who denied this could dodge this
particular objection.
57
Even more strikingly, the heir to the throne has various privileges on the basis of his
future status as king. However, this seems to me to be a different kind of case. It is not
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call properties like being addressed as “Mr. President” perpetual properties: they are non-temporally-indexed properties that an individual has
in virtue of having other properties that are temporally indexed. Conversely, properties like being a wife are non-perpetual properties: they are
non-temporally-indexed properties that an individual has in virtue of
having other properties that are not temporally indexed, and which the
individual has only at the same time as they have those other properties.
The question is whether being human is a perpetual property or not.
Intuitions on this key question vary. But if being human is a perpetual
property, then it is impossible for someone to cease being human. However, suppose a human being were to be transformed into some other
animal—perhaps undergoing some dreadful gradual metamorphosis
into, say, a tiger, until she were indistinguishable from a normal tiger,
right down to the genetic level. Would it not be natural to say that she had
ceased to be a human being and become a tiger? It would seem very odd
to suppose that she were a human being who is physically indistinguishable from a tiger—or, odder still, that she had become a tiger without ceasing to be a human being.
If this is correct, then being human is a non-perpetual property. Whatever the circumstances are in virtue of which the Son may be called human, he can be called human only while those circumstances hold—and
saying that they hold at some other time, or rephrasing them so that they
refer to some other time in this way, will not do. If the Son’s humanity
derives from his existing in a certain relation to a human body and soul,
then he is human only while he actually exists in that relation. If this is so,
then any temporalist model of the incarnation is committed to TI.
What if we reject this reasoning, and insist that being human is a perpetual property: anyone who is human remains human no matter what
happens, and holders of temporalist models of the incarnation are therefore not committed to TI? Even then, a problem remains. As we have seen,
any conception of Christ’s continued humanity that does not involve his
continued embodiment is fraught with problems. But while it may be
questionable whether a person counts as human even after losing humanmaking properties, whatever they may be, it is clearly false to suppose that
a person could count as embodied even after losing embodied-making
properties, namely, having a body. Being embodied is certainly a nonperpetual property. To have a body means to exist in a relation of some
kind with a piece of matter. And one has the body only at those times
when one exists in the relation (in a non-temporally-indexed way)—otherwise, we would have no concept of becoming disembodied.
This being so, we can state a modified version of TI, like this:
TI': Whatever the circumstances are in virtue of which the Son may
legitimately be said to be embodied, these circumstances must (a) not
because he will be king that the heir enjoys his privileges, but because he is expected to become
king; he enjoys them even if he turns out never to become king.
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be temporally indexed, and (b) hold at every time when the Son may
legitimately be said to be human.
As we have seen, the exaltation and perpetual humanity requirements
are that any orthodox model of the incarnation must allow the following
statements to be true:
1. It is true now that Christ has, and exercises, all the divine attributes,
including omnipotence and omniscience.
2. It is true now that the Son is fully human as well as fully divine.
Any temporalist model of the incarnation can hold these to be true only
when the following claims are true:
3. It is true that Christ now has, and exercises, all the divine attributes,
including omnipotence and omniscience.
4. It is true that the Son is now fully human as well as fully divine.
But by TI, (4) can be the case only if whatever circumstances make the Son
human are in effect right now. It is not enough for them to have been in effect
during Jesus’s earthly lifetime. Alternatively, if we think that being human
is a perpetual property and that temporalists are therefore not committed
to TI, they are certainly committed to TI'—which means that, while they
could maintain that the Son is now fully human, they could not maintain
that he is now embodied, which is equally problematic. And the view that
the Son’s human-making (or embodied-making) circumstances are in effect
right now is difficult to maintain no matter what model of the incarnation is
being used. If this is so, it follows that no temporalist model of the incarnation can easily meet the requirements we have been considering.
V
What of atemporalist models? It should be clear what we mean by this
term: an atemporalist model of the incarnation is one that combines belief
in the incarnation with a view of God as atemporal. On such a view, the
Son, since he is God, is atemporal.
There are two possible kinds of atemporalist models, which I will call
simple atemporalist and mixed atemporalist. On the former, the Son remains
“outside” time, even during the incarnation. Whatever relation exists between Jesus, who lived during an identifiable period of history, and the
Son, it is a relation between something temporal and something atemporal. Brian Leftow argues for a model of this kind, in which the Son is
a timeless part of a whole, the other parts being Christ’s body and soul,
which exist in time.58 Thomas Torrance has also defended such a view.59
58
Brian Leftow, “A Timeless God Incarnate,” in The Incarnation: an Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. S. Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O’Collins (Oxford:
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On mixed atemporalism, by contrast, the Son is atemporal, but in the incarnation he becomes temporal as well. Instead of imagining what relations
would hold between the atemporal Son and his temporal human body
(or body and mind), we suppose that the Son becomes temporal, enjoying
temporal relations with his human body (or body and mind). At any given
time, it is true at that time that the Son exists atemporally, because the
pre-incarnate Son (taking “pre-” to indicate logical, rather than temporal,
priority) exists atemporally. For any time prior to the incarnation, it is false
that the Son exists at that time (although true that he exists atemporally).
During the incarnation, however, it is true that the Son exists at that time
(in an embodied state), and it is also true that the Son exists atemporally
(in a non-embodied state). If at some point the Son ceases to be incarnate,
then for any time after that point, it is once again false that the Son exists
at that time (although, again, it is still true that the Son exists atemporally,
and indeed that the Son did exist at an earlier time).
I do not know of any author who has articulated mixed atemporalism
in a clear and unambiguous way, but suggestions of it can be found in
a number of writers. Gerald O’Collins offers a suggestion which I take
to be something like this, although he does not go into details.60 Piet
Schoonenberg also sketched a theory along these lines.61 A number of
devotional writers, particularly in the evangelical tradition, also seem to
presuppose a view of this kind.62
Could an atemporal being really become temporal, with the odd consequences described above? We might ask on what grounds the temporal
Son could be considered identical with the atemporal Son at all. The suggestion is that a divine person appears within time at a particular point;
before that time, the statement “a divine person exists now” was false, but
after that time, it was true. Why would we identify this temporal divine
person with the atemporal Son—or indeed with any atemporal divine being? Why would it not be a brand new divine being, one that differs from
other divine beings in being temporal?
One might attempt to base a solution upon the relations that the temporal divine person has to the other divine persons. Traditionally, the
O’Collins, Incarnation, 15.
See Piet Schoonenberg, The Christ: A Study of the God-Man Relationship in the Whole of
Creation and in Jesus Christ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 83–87, where he suggests
that the Father is eternal, and there is a distinction between the immanent Son (who exists
non-personally as the Father’s Reason) and the incarnate Son (who exists personally within
time, as Jesus Christ). See also Brian McDermott, Word Become Flesh: Dimensions of Christology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1993), 181.
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he came into the world. The word was not spoken from the sky; ‘the Word was made flesh,’”
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persons of the Trinity are thought to be distinguished solely by their
mutual relations. Accordingly, one might say that the temporal divine
being would have the same relations to the Father and the Spirit that the
atemporal Son does; consequently, the temporal divine being would be
identical with the atemporal Son, since these relations are all that individuate him. But this answer would also be problematic, since it would be
hard to show that the temporal divine being does bear the same relations
to the Father and the Spirit that the atemporal Son does. For one thing, if
atemporalism is true, then the relations which the Son bears to the Father
and the Spirit are timeless. For example, he is not merely begotten by the
Father—he is timelessly begotten by the Father. Could a temporal divine
being bear this relation to the Father? The begetting might be timeless
from the Father’s point of view, but from the point of view of the temporal
divine being, it would not be timeless. It would seem, then, that the relation he would bear to the Father would not be the same relation as the one
that the atemporal Son bears to the Father, in which case it would follow
that he could not be identical with the atemporal Son.
Such a model also raises the problematic possibility of the temporal
and atemporal Sons communicating or otherwise relating to each other.
If we accept, as most atemporalists do,63 that an atemporal God can have
relations with temporal beings—for example, hearing their prayers, or
bestowing grace upon them—then it seems that the atemporal Son could
have these same relations with the temporal Son. The odd image is raised
of Jesus praying not simply to the Father but to the Son as well, even
though he is the Son. That seems distinctly unpalatable.
If this is so, then the atemporalist cannot have her cake and eat it too. If
the Son is to be atemporal, he must remain atemporal—he cannot be temporal as well. I conclude that mixed atemporalism is incoherent, and that the
atemporalist believer in the incarnation should hold simple atemporalism.64
VI
Armed with this conclusion, we may consider the atemporalist equivalents of the temporalist transformationalist, Son-body, and compositionalist models that we looked at earlier, taking “atemporalist” to mean strong
atemporalism only.
We can dispose of the atemporalist transformationalist model quickly,
since such a model would be simply incoherent. The transformationalist model states that the Son is literally transformed into a human body.
But an atemporal entity cannot be transformed into anything, since to
63
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be transformed is to undergo change; it requires that the entity in question have one property or set of properties at time t1, and have a different
property or set of properties at time t2. Perhaps there is a way around this.
Suppose we were to say that to have a property or set of properties at time
a means to have them atemporally: to have a property at time a means to
exist outside time and, existing outside time, to have that property. And to
have a property or set of properties at time t means to have them at some
specified point within time, in the usual way. Then we might say that an
entity could have one property or set of properties at time a, and another
property or set of properties at time t. To say this, we would have to envisage that the entity in question exists atemporally and temporally—because
if it did not exist temporally at all, it could not have any properties at time
t.65 But this would be mixed atemporalism, which we have already seen
reason to reject.
Similar problems would beset an atemporalist Son-body model. The
proponent of this model does not suppose that the Son is transformed
into a human body, but she does suppose that he undergoes the rather
less radical transformation into a human mind. But again this could not
happen if the Son does not change, which again presupposes that the
Son is temporal. More particularly, the Son-body model requires that
the Son bear to his body the same relation that our minds bear to our
bodies. But the sorts of things that human minds do (when embodied)
surely require that they exist temporally.66 These things include discursive thought—where one thought follows another, for example in chains
of reasoning. It is hard to see how an atemporal mind could deliberate
about what to do.67
On Swinburne’s model, the Son acquires a mental stream of consciousness which is phenomenologically indistinguishable from that of
a “mere” human. It is this stream, for example, which experiences discursive thought. That stream, then, must be temporal. But if this stream
is part of the divine mind, then the divine mind must be temporal as a
65
For a being that exists only outside time and not within time, it might be true at time t
that it bears certain properties, but it would not be true that it bears those properties at time
t, and it is the latter which would be required on this conception of what would be involved
for an atemporal being to be transformed.
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whole—for how could an atemporal mind contain a temporal stream of
consciousness? Alternatively, what if the human stream is not part of the
divine mind? Perhaps it is “hosted” by the human body (and particularly
its brain); or perhaps it is distinct from both the divine mind and the human body (assuming some kind of dualism). But in both of these cases,
we have departed from the Son-body model, since we are now envisaging
that Christ consists of the Son plus a human body plus a human mind,
and that is compositionalism. It seems, then, that an atemporalist Sonbody model is not viable.
There remains the atemporalist compositionalist account. This is the
model defended by Brian Leftow, according to which Christ is a composite of a temporal human body and soul and the atemporal Son. The
Son remains atemporal, never directly experiencing temporality. His
human experiences and identity are derived from the relation he bears
to the human body and soul that do exist within time. It is rather as, in
the film Avatar, human characters can experience life as members of the
Na’vi alien race by remotely controlling Na’vi “avatars.” The link with the
avatars is so close, with the humans experiencing the world through the
avatars’ senses, that they can legitimately say that they have met the Na’vi
and lived among them—even though the humans themselves are lying
in a lab plugged into complex controllers the whole time. They remain
outside the Na’vi environment even while they are exploring it. Similarly,
on atemporalist compositionalism, the Son remains non-temporal, but he
experiences human life, including temporality, as a result of his relation
to a human body and soul that are within time.
As we have already noted, a key difference between the Son-body and
the compositionalist models is that the former is committed to the claim
that the Son bears the same relation to his human body that all human
beings do to their bodies, while the latter is not.68 Of course, the Son must
bear some relations to the human body, in virtue of which it counts as his
body; he must also bear some relations to the human mind, in virtue of
which it counts as his human mind. But a crucial difference is that these
need not necessitate that he is temporal. I have argued that nothing could
bear the same relations to a human body that a human mind does without
being temporal, and that this is a fatal flaw in any Son-body atemporalist model. But since, on a compositionalist model, there is no compelling
need to suppose that the Son bears these particular relations to the human
body, there is also no compelling need to suppose that he would have to
be temporal to bear the relations that he does bear to it.
How might an atemporalist compositionalist handle the exaltation and
perpetual humanity requirements? I take it that there is clearly no problem with the exaltation requirement. On atemporalism, the Son does not
change, because atemporal things cannot change. If at any point in time
it is true that the Son enjoys the divine properties such as omnipotence
68
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and omniscience, then that is true at every point in time, including during
Jesus’s earthly career and afterwards.
What of the perpetual humanity requirement? Here there is a very
significant difference from all the temporalist models. As we saw, any
temporalist model must hold TI, the principle that states that, if the Son
is to remain human after his exaltation, the state of affairs in virtue of
which he was human before his exaltation must continue to hold. If he was
human in virtue of having a body, then he must continue to have a body.
If he was human in virtue of having certain mental features, then he must
continue to have those features. These models all suffered the same weakness—that it was implausible to suppose that the human-making state of
affairs continued to hold, no matter what that state of affairs might be. It
was especially implausible to suppose that it continued to hold and yet
that Jesus exercised his omnipotence and omniscience fully.
But an atemporalist model is not committed to TI. This is because, if
the Son is atemporal, then it is timelessly true of him that the HICs hold—
whatever they may be. On a compositionalist model, the Son is human in
virtue of the fact that he exists in a certain relation to a human mind and
body. On an atemporalist version of this model, he exists timelessly in
that relation. The statement “the Son exists in a human-making relation to
the mind and body of Jesus” is true at all times, whether before, during,
or after the earthly lifetime of Jesus. As Brian Leftow remarks, “If God is
timeless and is incarnate, then he just is timelessly incarnate: the whole of
his timeless life is spent so.”69
If the Son is human in virtue of existing in a certain relation to Jesus’s
body and soul, then because, on atemporalism, the Son exists outside time,
it is true at all times that he (timelessly) exists in that relation to them. It is
no more true during Jesus’s lifetime than it is at any other time, including
the period afterwards or even today. The Son is not human now—but on
atemporalism, the Son does not exist now either. Rather, it is now true that
the Son is human, just as it is now true that the Son exists.
What of the Son’s relation to his body? I have argued that any temporalist model of the incarnation that seeks to respect the perpetual humanity
requirement is committed to the view that Jesus’s body continues to exist
somewhere. But an atemporalist model is not so committed. If it is true
now that the Son is human, because he (atemporally) exists in certain relations to the (temporal) human body and soul of Jesus, then it is equally true
now that he has a body. It is precisely that same body during that same
period; it is not necessary for that body to continue to exist within time for
it to continue to be true that the Son has it. So where the temporalist has
to explain where Jesus’s body went at his exaltation, or face the prospect
of the Son’s no longer being human (or at least no longer being incarnate),
the atemporalist does not have to suppose that it went anywhere, because
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its continued existence within time is not required for it still to be true that
the Son is incarnate.
In some ways, this may seem an unsatisfactory conclusion. I have
argued that the proponent of atemporalist compositionalism can, if she
wishes, take statements about Christ’s post-glorification status literally,
whereas other models of the incarnation are unable to do so—meaning
that proponents of those models are committed to taking those statements
only in a figurative sense, if at all. But on atemporalist compositionalism,
it is true (now) that the Son is human only because of what happened
in the Holy Land centuries ago. Although the proponent of this model
of the incarnation can legitimately say that it is true now that the Son is
human and embodied, nevertheless, this is not because the Son’s human
body exists now. This view does not leave any room for saying, for example, that Christ is currently seated at the right hand of the Father, as is
stated in Ephesians 1:20, Hebrews 8:1, and so on. He cannot do that if his
body exists only between 4 BCE and 30 CE. Similarly, the glorified Christ
does not really have a glorified body, as Revelation 1:12–16 suggests, and
one cannot hope to see Christ’s face in the new Jerusalem, as Revelation
22:4 promises.
The proponent of atemporalist compositionalism has two possible
replies. The first is that, although the existence of Jesus’s body between
4 BCE and 30 CE in the Holy Land is sufficient for the statement “The Son
is incarnate” to be true now, that does not preclude Jesus’s body existing at
other times and places as well. I argued earlier that, for a temporalist, the
claim that Jesus’s body still exists in a space quite distinct from our own is
implausible—partly because such a space could not be part of our timeline,
and partly because it is hard to see how Jesus’s body could move to such a
space and still be the same body. For an atemporalist, the second of these
considerations is still a problem, but not the first, because as we have seen,
an atemporalist is not committed to the view that, if it is true now that the
Son has a body, the Son’s body must exist now. An atemporalist could hold
that Jesus’s body exists in a wholly different spacetime (so “exists” in that
statement is not in the present tense, and not atemporal either), but it is still
true now that “The Son is incarnate” or “The Son has a body” for the reasons already given. In that case, the claims about the glorified Christ mentioned in the previous paragraph—including the idea that Christians might
meet him in the flesh—could be true of his body in the other spacetime.
The second possible reply is to accept that Jesus’s body existed only
during his earthly career and was not translated to an alternative spacetime, and that the claims just mentioned cannot be taken literally. They
have, perhaps, a figurative meaning. And if this is so, then the question
with which we began our investigation was not quite right. It is not a
question of whether it is possible to interpret statements about Christ’s
post-glorification status literally, but which statements could be taken literally. For any model of the incarnation other than atemporalist compositionalism, all statements about Christ’s post-glorification status must be
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taken only figuratively, at best. The atemporalist compositionalist retains
more options: she must take as figurative any statements that presuppose
the continued existence of Christ’s body, but she has the conceptual resources to take as literally true the statement that it is now true that Christ
is human—a possibility not open to proponents of other models of the
incarnation. To the extent to which retaining this option is considered
desirable, then, compositionalism is to be preferred to its rivals.
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